Suchergebnisse

Der Forschungsbericht des Netzwerks "Connecting Research on Extremism in North Rhine-Westphalia", kurz CoRE-NRW, ist eine Handreichung, welche die aktuelle Landschaft der Radikalisierungs- und Extremismusforschung systematisch präsentiert. Die dargestellte Forschungslandschaft bezieht sich dabei nicht allein auf spezielle wissenschaftliche Vorhaben und Einrichtungen in den Forschungsfeldern Islamismus und Rechtsextremismus, sondern bezieht auch die Auseinandersetzung mit angrenzenden und querschnittlich verlaufenden Aspekten, wie u.a. Antisemitismus, Rassismus und Verschwörungserzählungen, mit ein. Der Forschungsbericht beinhaltet wissenschaftliche Projekte und Forschungseinrichtungen, die im Berichtszeitraum von August 2021 bis Juli 2022 einschlägige Forschung betrieben haben. Der Bericht ist in drei Cluster gegliedert: 1) Islamismus, 2) Rechtsextremismus und Rassismus sowie 3) Phänomenübergreifende Forschung und andere Formen des Extremismus. Innerhalb dieser Cluster wird die in NRW angesiedelte Forschung besonders hervorgehoben. Die Forschungslandschaft in NRW wird zudem auf der Webseite www.core-nrw.de präsentiert. Darüber hinaus werden im Forschungsbericht auch ausgewählte Vorhaben und Einrichtungen außerhalb NRWs vorgestellt. Dies umfasst sowohl in anderen Bundesländern angesiedelte, bzw. bundesweite Verbundforschung ohne direkten NRW-Bezug als auch Projekte auf europäischer Ebene. Die Kurzprofile zu den Forschungsunternehmungen leisten einen informativen Überblick, inklusive der Forschungsfragen, Methodik sowie erster Ergebnisse und aktueller Publikationen. Insgesamt werden 66 Vorhaben und Einrichtungen vorgestellt. Davon befinden sich 29 in NRW oder forschen mit Beteiligung einer in NRW ansässigen Einrichtung. Darunter sind acht Forschungsprojekte, die vom Ministerium für Kultur und Wissenschaft NRW im Rahmen von CoRE-NRW gefördert werden bzw. im Berichtszeit wurden. Die CoRE-NRW-Projekte decken alle drei Themencluster ab und betrachten unterschiedliche Teilaspekte. Im Cluster "Islamismus" sind drei Projekte im Berichtszeitraum aktiv gewesen, die sich mit der Präventionslandschaft und -diskursen (BICC, TU Dortmund), sowie mit den Alltagspraktiken salafistischer Gruppen (Universität zu Köln) auseinandersetzen. Im Cluster "Rechtsextremismus und Rassismus" legen CoRE-NRW-Projekte den Fokus auf verschiedene, in der Forschung bisher vernachlässigte Themen wie z.B. die Perspektive von Betroffenen rassistischer Gewalt (TH Köln), Formen der Hasskriminalität (Ruhr-Universität Bochum), Konzepte und Debatten der Neuen Rechten (DISS) und vigilantische Gruppen in NRW (Hochschule Düsseldorf). Im Cluster Drei befasst sich das CoRE-NRW-Projekt EMRA mit einer vergleichenden Modellierung von Radikalisierungsprozessen (Hochschule des Bundes, Universität Münster). Der Forschungsbericht ist keine erschöpfende Darstellung der Forschungslandschaft, weder in NRW noch bundesweit oder in Europa. Es gibt viele Wissenschaftler:innen, die jenseits von Drittmittelprojekten und Institutionen mit explizitem Fokus auf Radikalisierung oder Extremismus zu Themen, die für das Forschungsfeld relevant sind, arbeiten, jedoch im vorliegenden Bericht nicht erfasst werden oder aus bestimmten Gründen nicht im Forschungsbericht auftauchen möchten. Grundsätzlich steht CoRE-NRW und die Publikationsreihe des Netzwerks, zu der auch dieser Forschungsbericht gehört, allen Forscher:innen, die engverwandte Forschungsansätze oder -beiträge präsentieren wollen, offen.

Migration in northern Iraq is a product of global, postcolonial processes driven by highly unequal international relations of global capitalism and geopolitics. With a focus on 'reintegration' experiences of returnees to northern Iraq who have left abroad over the last four decades and returned since the 1990s, this Working Paper takes into view a myriad of people who had very different reasons for migrating - either for conflict/political and/or economic reason - and returning at some or several points in time. While their experiences after return with settling (back) in are highly individual, this Paper focuses on reintegration as a process from an emic perspective. It analyses the experiences of compelled and self-decided returnees in re-establishing themselves after return by looking at their return preparedness - understood as the willingness and readiness to return - at the individual and institutional level. Therefore, four reintegration dimensions (economic, social, psychological, political-structural) form the lens for the investigation. Studying (northern) Iraq, among other origin and return countries for migrants in Europe, is unique because financial remittances do not constitute a main motivation for emigration as, e.g., in West Africa or the Western Balkans. Instead, Iraqi Kurds seek a better life, and their migration entails the search for autonomy and often signifies a political act of emancipation from governance failure in the origin context.

Understanding and facilitating reintegration requires a holistic perspective that includes understanding people's reasons for leaving as well as their migration- and return-related aspirations. These determine whether migrants aim and prepare for their return themselves, resulting in different levels of return preparedness and pointing to potential reintegration barriers. Data from this study shows a clear correlation between (a) aspiring to return at the time of migration and self-organised (unassisted) return and (b) between a lack of return aspirations resulting in low or no return preparedness and assisted return. A lack of willingness and / or readiness to return is what makes reintegration assistance a particularly challenging endeavour. Migration and return are embedded in social and often transnational networks, with the most substantial and reliable reintegration support from family networks. Support capacities of these networks are, however, often negatively correlated to the needs of returnees. Family support can dwindle or stop altogether while support capacities of families are often only maintained through those who have migrated. While economic opportunities are the most prominent reasons for migration and obstacles to reintegration, the long-term data analysis shows that migration itself has only a limited effect on improving livelihoods. In most cases, the potential to capitalise on migration-related opportunities depended on resource and network endowments from before migration; otherwise, positive effects of migration are confined to maintaining a livelihood. Rather than by geography, respondents more likely defined 'home' and belonging as a social place (often the family) and / or as a state of mental and psychological well-being. At the same time, they experience an inability to combine everything they aspire to in one geographical place and having to live continuously in transnational families as well as re-negotiations of social relations upon return as distressing. Return and reintegration assistance is part of the contested multi-stakeholder field of return governance, leading to a diversity of approaches and gaps regarding access, needs orientation and evidence base. In the initial phase after return, reintegration assistance can be critical to some returnees. What makes for a sustainable effect are long-term trustful relationships, flexibility and needs orientation, actively engaging returnees in shaping their future, opening social spaces and helping to (re-)establish connections. A more systematic matching of individual-level and structural / institutional assistance and including vulnerable non-migrants can increase positive effects.

This Working Paper explores and compares return to and reintegration in Ghana, the Gambia and Senegal while setting different positionalities of migrants against migration and return regimes and broader socio-economic inequalities. The Paper first highlights the trajectories and motivations of migrants and returnees, including a group-centred perspective on the continuous relevance of relations with the communities of origin. Then, it relates migrant journeys to diverging national political economies and policies. Differing return policies on the one hand and conflicting interests and expectations of the involved actors on the other create unequal options and expectations of mobility. The case studies show that diverging experiences of return, thus, not only depend on the individual situations, such as differences in age, gender, legal status or social class, but also the broader social context, the existing economic situation - and finally the politicised relations and interests between stakeholders in the migration and return processes. The findings on circular mobility and division of labour respectively widen the perspective on return and reintegration policies, wich have traditionally been shaped by a uni-linear uni-directional bias.

In this Paper, I address the question of whether and under what circumstances the deployment of pro-government militias (PGMs) can reduce violence against civilians, specifically in the Sahel. My analysis - based on a literature review and case studies on Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Mali, Niger, and Nigeria - suggests that rather than representing a solution, PGMs tend to become part of the problem. In most cases, PGMs actively carry out acts of violence against civilians or passively contribute to an increase in violence. According to my analysis, PGMs most tend to contribute to violence against civilians when: \ they are aligned with a government that shows little respect for human rights and makes little effort to curb violence against civilians by its own security forces; \ they take on offensive roles and cooperate with state security forces; \ they are a group of ethnically homogenous members that are armed by the state. Only when PGMs are socially embedded in the communities they aim to protect and are at least normatively controlled by local authorities, as well as defensively oriented and predominantly unarmed, do they - for example in Cameroon - contribute to a decrease in violence against civilians. The findings presented in this Paper have implications for German development policy. As outlined, PGMs can - under very specific circumstances - help to strengthen the resilience of the local population in armed conflicts. However, in view of the negative effects of most PGMs, transitional development assistance programmes must be tailored according to the risk arising from the presence of PGMs. Furthermore, since many of these groups prevail past the end of the armed conflict in question, they need to be considered in post-conflict reconstruction processes, especially in demobilisation, disarmament, and reintegration (DDR) programmes and security sector reforms (SSR) to allow sustainable peace and development.Finally, the findings also have implications for German and European policy on arms transfers. Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, and Nigeria are key partners of Germany's Enable and Enhance Initiative (Ertüchtigungsinitiative) and may also receive military arms and equipment via the European Peace Facility (EPF). At the same time, three of these governments not only cooperate with PGMs, but have also (allegedly) provided them with weapons. While German arms shipments to countries like Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, and Nigeria are unlikely to take place under the first initiative, they cannot be ruled out under the EPF. This underscores the need for strict arms export restrictions or postshipment controls at the European level.

Scholars and practitioners alike have found illicit cross-border flows - from drugs to wildlife and weapons - to converge and reinforce each other while often being embedded in large transnational criminal networks. However, practitioners still lack the tools and guidance to effectively combat these links in an integrated fashion. Cross-border cooperation initiatives across Africa are in a unique position to mitigate illicit trafficking, and yet, there is no conceptual model that could guide initiatives in doing so. This Knowledge Note seeks to bridge this gap in the context of BICC's small arms control work in Africa. It provides an initial selection of six building blocks (I-VI) that could structure and guide our future work on cross-border cooperation to reduce the illicit trafficking of small arms and light weapons (SALW) and ammunition in East Africa and beyond. The proposed model brings together a review of practice and policy advice on different illicit flows, thus showing how they are connected. It embraces the opportunity to put on a broader lens and look beyond the realm of arms trafficking. Across the six building blocks, the willingness of all actors to engage in long-term, sustainable and evidence-based cooperation as well as to ensure political buy-in at all levels seem crucial for cross-border efforts to be effective. Follow-up engagements and testing in the field are to refine this desk study's initial model.

Der Globale Militarisierungsindex (GMI) des BICC bildet alljährlich das relative Gewicht und die Bedeutung des Militärapparats von Staaten im Verhältnis zur Gesellschaft als Ganzes ab. Der Index wird durch das Bundesministerium für Wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung (BMZ) gefördert. Der GMI 2021 ist eine Jubiläumsausgabe. Der erste Teil des Berichtes reflektiert, wie gewohnt, auf Grundlage der neuesten Daten aktuelle Entwicklungen und Trends. Er umfasst 153 Staaten und basiert auf den aktuell vorliegenden Zahlen, in der Regel sind das die Daten des Jahres 2020. Die zehn Länder, die im GMI 2021 den höchsten Militarisierungsgrad aufweisen, sind Israel, Oman, Aserbaidschan, Kuwait, Armenien, Saudi-Arabien, Brunei, Bahrain, Singapur und Russland. Diese Staaten stellen dem Militär im Verhältnis zu anderen gesellschaftlichen Bereichen besonders viele Ressourcen zur Verfügung. Neben vornehmlich Staaten aus Konfliktregionen des Nahen und Mittleren Ostens, sind auch hier drei europäische Länder präsent, die jeweils in Gewaltkonflikte involviert sind. Drei weitere - die beiden EU-Mitglieder Griechenland und Zypern sowie die Ukraine - sind unter den Top 20 zu finden. Im regionalen Fokus Europa wird ein Gesamttrend des GMI 2021 besonders deutlich: Trotz des Absinkens des weltweiten BIP in Folge der Covid 19-Pandemie wenden Staaten in absoluten Zahlen und im Verhältnis zur Wirtschaftsleistung mehr Ressourcen für das Militär auf. Ein weiterer regionaler Fokus liegt diesmal auf Subsahara Afrika. Insbesondere in Westafrika verschlechterte sich die Sicherheitslage in den vergangenen Jahren dramatisch. Daher ist eine Betrachtung der Militarisierungsdynamiken auf dem Kontinent besonders interessant. So rangieren unter seinen Top 10 neben relativ stabilen Ländern wie Botswana, Namibia, Mauretanien, Angola, Gabun und Guinea-Bissau auch Staaten mit aktuellen Gewaltkonflikten wie Tschad, Südsudan und Mali. Der zweite Teil des GMI 2021 betrachtet die globale und regionale Entwicklung von Militarisierung über die vergangenen 20 Jahre. Die Gesamtbetrachtung der globalen Militarisierung zwischen 2000 und 2020 ergibt, dass diese, bis auf ein Zwischenhoch im Jahr 2005, bis 2018 zunächst kontinuierlich sinkt. Unser ressourcenbezogenes Konzept von Militarisierung erklärt dies so: Es ist das Anwachsen sowohl der Weltbevölkerung als auch der globalen finanziellen Mittel, die im GMI den Anteil des militärischen Sektors von 2000 bis 2018 geringer werden lässt. Dies bedeutet jedoch keine "echte Demilitarisierung", wie die absolute Steigerung der Militärausgaben im Bezugszeitraum belegt (SIPRI 2020). Seit 2019 hat sich dieser Trend wieder umgekehrt. In den letzten zwei Jahren ist weltweit eine steigende Militarisierung zu beobachten, was vor allem darauf zurückzuführen ist, dass die dem Militär zugewiesenen Ressourcen nicht nur absolut, sondern auch relativ steigen.

Every year, BICC's Global Militarisation Index (GMI) maps the relative weight and importance of a country's military apparatus in relation to its society as a whole. The Index is financially supported by Germany's Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development. The GMI 2021 is an anniversary edition. Its first part reflects, as usual, current developments and trends based on the latest available data. It covers 153 countries and is based on the latest available figures (in most cases, data for 2020). The ten countries with the highest levels of militarisation in the GMI 2021 are Israel, Oman, Azerbaijan, Kuwait, Armenia, Saudi Arabia, Brunei, Bahrain, Singapore and Russia. These countries allocate particularly high levels of resources to the military compared to other areas of society. Besides countries primarily from conflict regions in the Middle East, three European countries can also be found here, all of which are involved in violent conflicts. A further three - Greece and Cyprus, both EU member states, and Ukraine - are among the Top 20. In the regional focus on Europe, one overall trend of the GMI 2021 becomes particularly clear: Despite the decrease in global GDP as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, countries are spending more resources on the military in absolute terms and as a proportion of their economic output. Another regional focus this time is on Sub-Saharan Africa. In West Africa, in particular, the security situation has deteriorated dramatically over the past few years. Therefore, it is particularly interesting to look at the dynamics of militarisation on that continent. Alongside relatively stable countries, such as Botswana, Namibia, Mauritania, Angola, Gabon and Guinea-Bissau, countries with current violent conflicts, such as Chad, South Sudan and Mali, can be found among the Top 10. The second part of the GMI looks at the global and regional development of militarisation over the past 20 years. This overall view of global militarisation between 2000 and 2020 shows that, except for an interim peak in 2005, it initially decreased steadily. Our resource-based concept of militarisation explains this as follows: It is due to the increase in the world's population and that of global financial resources, which cause the proportion of the military sector in the GMI to decrease from 2000 to 2018. This, however, does not imply "true demilitarisation", as is evidenced by the absolute increase in military spending over the period under review (SIPRI, 2020). Since 2019, this trend has reversed again. In the past two years, rising militarisation can be observed again across the globe, mainly because the resources allocated to the military are increasing in absolute and in relative terms.

Across the destination countries of migration, i.e. migrant-receiving countries, in Europe there has been an increasing emphasis on return and reintegration programmes. These programmes particularly target rejected asylum-seekers forced to return, irregular migrants unable to legalise their stay in the migration country and migrants wishing to return of their own volition. Reintegration commonly refers to the processes that unfold after the return of migrants, refugees and internally displaced persons to their country of origin or place of residence as they set about trying to re-establish their lives. However, the reintegration trajectories of assisted and non-assisted returning migrants in different contexts have scarcely been researched. Funded by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) under a Special Initiative on "Tackling the root causes of displacement and (re-)integrating refugees", BICC has undertaken over the past four years (2019-2022) a qualitative research project entitled "Trajectories of reintegration" designed to tackle this desideratum. This Synthesis Report brings together selected findings of the project's empirical studies in the Western Balkans (Serbia, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo), West Africa (Ghana, Senegal, the Gambia) and the Middle East (Iraq). The BICC project team conducted an in-depth, long-term investigation into reintegration trajectories focusing on the perceptions, experiences and strategies of returning migrants. We collected data through in-depth qualitative interviews, life-stories, informal conversations and observations. The interview sample includes returnees who were displaced persons (refugees, rejected asylum-seekers), long-term labour migrants, 'irregular' migrants, student migrants, and circular or seasonal migrants. We conducted semi-structured interviews with stakeholders, including government officials, municipal actors and representatives of local NGOs and development agencies. The project team also cooperated closely with local researchers and research assistants, integrating their feedback into the ongoing research findings. To this end we ran training courses and organised several stakeholder workshops in the countries of research.

his Working Paper investigates the (re-)integration trajectories of returnees to the two Western Balkan countries Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. By applying a multidimensional and processual understanding of (re-)integration, it scrutinises how returnees' positionality as well as local context conditions influence returnees' experiences and livelihood strategies upon return. The study covers returnees with diverse backgrounds, ranging from self-organised early post-war returns of refugees and IDPs, forced returnees, returning "guest workers", more recent irregular and regular labour migrants, pendular migrants, students, (rejected) asylum seekers, and returnees with diverging socio-eco nomic and educational levels, age and ethnic and religious identities, different durations of stay abroad and a wide array of destination countries. By doing so, it finds - despite significant differences in the return contexts and the socio-economic status of returnees - similar patterns among the very diverse group of returnees covered in both countries, namely the main role of (trans)local networks and mobility for the adjustment processes in the course of migration, displacement and return. By comparing trajectories of returnees who received different kinds of return and reintegration assistance with those who did not, the Paper also provides some insights into the opportunities and limits of reintegration assistance. The study's findings underline the relevance of individualised needs-based support measures in specific cases as well as approaches aiming to generally support inclusive societal structures. The study is based on qualitative data collected among returnees, experts and stakeholders in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia between 2019 and 2022 in the framework of the research project "Trajectories of reintegration. The impacts of displacement, migration and return on social change".

For over a hundred years, the 8th of March marks the feminist day of struggle, nowadays still mainly celebrated as International Women's Day. Although we have come far, the sole reference to 'women' is problematic since it reproduces a gender binary that excludes anyone that does not identify with the sex assigned to them at birth, i.e., transgender (in short: trans) and non-binary individuals. This tends to undermine and even deny the day's aim to fight sexism and misogyny in all its forms. Perhaps a good way to counter this trend is to incorporate trans and non-binary perspectives systematically into peace and conflict research.

Every year, ICC's Global Militarisation Index (GMI) maps the relative weight and importance of a country's military apparatus in relation to its society as a whole. The Index is financially supported by Germany's Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development. Its first part reflects current developments and trends based on the latest available data. It covers 154 states and is based on the latest available figures (in most cases, data for 2021). The ten countries with the highest level of militarisation in the GMI 2022 are Israel, Kuwait, Armenia, Singapore, Oman, Bahrain, Greece, Russia, Brunei and Saudi Arabia. These countries allocate particularly large amounts of resources to their military compared to other areas of society. As far as the general militarisation trend is concerned, the GMI 2022 offers a seemingly contradictory picture. It appears that the general upward trend of the previous years is not continuing. This is mainly due to the drop in relative military expenditure, which, measured as a share of GDP (gross domestic product), fell on average from 2.3 to 2.2 per cent, which, in turn, is mainly due to the economic recovery after the Covid-19 pandemic. At the same time, despite a positive population trend, the number of heavy weapons increased in relative and absolute terms, reaching 396,914 this year, a figure last measured in 2012. The second part of the GMI focuses on two regional aspects. For one, we will investigate the planned enlargement of NATO to include Sweden and Finland as member states. Using the three GMI parameters of personnel, financial resources and heavy weapons, we compare NATO with Russia and the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO). In addition, we take up the 100 billion special fund for the Bundeswehr and sketch out two different scenarios for the militarisation of Germany for the next five years. This year, the conflict between China, Taiwan and the so-called AUKUS countries (Australia, United Kingdom and United States) in the China Sea and the Pacific Ocean continued to escalate. The second regional focus is, therefore, on East Asia and Oceania. Here, we contrast the military potential of the AUKUS countries with that of China. We estimate the degree of militarisation of North Korea and Taiwan, two key countries in the regional conflict. However, as this estimate is based on divergent or older data sources, it is not included in the GMI dataset or the official ranking. This year, the GMI has also evolved methodologically: We complemented the Heavy Weapons Index by including unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs) and loitering munitions (so-called kamikaze drones) as well as satellites.

Seit 2000 wird am 25. November der Internationale Tag zur Beseitigung der Gewalt gegen Frauen begangen. Er sollte ein Zeichen setzen, "Rechte und Freiheiten im Falle von Gewalt gegen Frauen zu schützen und zu fördern." Die Autorinnen des BICC-Kommentars sehen die Welt von diesem Ziel immer noch weit entfernt. Denn wenn es um empirische Analyse der Zusammenhänge von Gender-Balance, Militarisierung und Gewalt gegen Frauen geht, gibt es ein Riesenproblem: Es fehlen die Daten!